MEV-Boost
MEV-Boost
First, one simple idea to hold in your head
MEV-Boost separates “who builds the block” from “who proposes the block”.
That’s it. Everything else is detail.
Think of it like this 👇
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Builder = expert chef (finds best MEV, arranges transactions)
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Validator (Proposer) = judge (just picks the best dish, doesn’t cook)
Why is MEV dangerous without MEV-Boost?
Let’s ask WHY first.
Without MEV-Boost:
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Validators:
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See all transactions
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Decide order
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Capture MEV themselves
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Big validators:
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Invest in better bots
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Earn more MEV
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Get bigger
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Become centralized
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Users:
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Get frontrun
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Pay higher gas
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Get sandwich attacked
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So the problem is power concentration.
What MEV-Boost does (super simple flow)
Step 1: Searchers find MEV
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Searchers = bots/traders
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They find arbitrage, liquidations, etc.
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They do NOT send txs to public mempool
👉 This avoids frontrunning wars.
Step 2: Builders build blocks
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Builders:
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Collect bundles from many searchers
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Arrange txs in the most profitable order
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Build a full block
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They calculate:
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“How much ETH can I pay the validator?”
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Step 3: Validators only see a promise, not the block
This is the most important protection.
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Builder sends validator:
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A block header
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A number: “I will pay you 2 ETH”
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Validator:
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Cannot see transactions
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Cannot steal MEV
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Just picks the highest paying header
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👉 This removes validator greed.
Step 4: Commit → Reveal
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Validator signs the header (commit)
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Builder reveals block body (transactions)
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Block goes on-chain
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Validator gets paid
This is called commit–reveal.
Why this protects Ethereum from BAD MEV
Now let’s directly map problem → solution.
1️⃣ Stops validator centralization
Problem:
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Big validators earn more MEV
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Small validators can’t compete
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Leads to staking pools dominating
MEV-Boost solution:
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Any validator (even solo staker):
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Can receive blocks from the same global builders
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Validators don’t need:
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MEV bots
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Infrastructure
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Private deals
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👉 Equal opportunity MEV access
This keeps solo staking viable.
2️⃣ Prevents validators from abusing users
Problem:
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Validator sees your transaction
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Reorders it
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Sandwich attacks you
MEV-Boost solution:
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Validator:
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Never sees txs
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Only sees a number (ETH payout)
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👉 No knowledge = no manipulation
3️⃣ Reduces gas wars (PGA)
Problem:
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Bots spam higher gas
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Network congested
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Normal users pay more
MEV-Boost solution:
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Bots:
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Send one sealed bid
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Off-chain
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No mempool bidding war
👉 Lower gas for everyone.
4️⃣ Improves user privacy
Problem:
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Public mempool = “Dark Forest”
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Everyone can see your tx and attack it
MEV-Boost solution:
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Searcher txs:
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Skip public mempool
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Go privately to builders
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👉 Less frontrunning, less sandwiching.
5️⃣ Reduces consensus attacks (reorgs)
Problem:
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Validator sees profitable block
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Reorgs chain to steal MEV
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Hurts finality and trust
MEV-Boost solution:
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Validator signs before seeing block
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Cannot decide to reorg based on contents
👉 No incentive to reorg
How MEV-Boost protects the PROTOCOL itself
| Risk | How MEV-Boost helps |
|---|---|
| Validator collusion | Validators can’t negotiate privately |
| Chain reorgs | No block visibility before signing |
| Centralization | Equal MEV access |
| Off-chain bribery | Transparent bidding via relays |
| Mempool chaos | Auctions moved off-chain |
Relays & Escrows (very simple)
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Relay:
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Gatekeeper
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Checks block validity
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Protects validator from bad blocks
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Escrow:
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Ensures data is available
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Prevents cheating during reveal
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Think of them as referees, not players.
How this leads to Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)
MEV-Boost is:
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❌ Not in protocol
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✅ A working prototype
Future Ethereum plan:
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PBS inside consensus
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No external relays
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Even stronger decentralization
One-line mental model (remember this)
MEV-Boost takes MEV power away from validators and gives it to a competitive market of builders, while protecting users and keeping Ethereum decentralized.
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