MEV

 

MEV


⭐ 1. WHAT IS MEV? (Deep Explanation)

MEV = profit extracted by controlling the ordering of transactions inside a block.

Meaning:

Who controls the order of transactions controls the profits.

Because different order = different outcome.

FOR EXAMPLE:

If Alice buys ETH
and one second later Bob buys ETH
the price is different.

So the person ordering transactions can:

  • insert their own transaction

  • reorder others

  • censor some

  • bundle multiple txs together

…and make money.


⭐ 2. WHY DOES MEV EXIST?

Because:

Blockchains allow:

  • Public mempools

  • Deterministic state machine

  • Known execution rules

  • Transparent AMMs

Since everything is public,
anyone can predict what will happen next if a transaction were executed.

That means:

✔ If someone does a big Uniswap swap → price will jump
✔ If someone is liquidatable → someone will liquidate them
✔ If someone creates arbitrage → someone will execute it

Therefore:

There is money to be made just by ordering transactions correctly.


⭐ 3. MEV = SPECIFICALLY ABOUT TRANSACTION ORDERING

Not about contract bugs
Not about rugpulls
Not about scams

MEV = ordering transactions to extract profit.


⭐ 4. WHO EXTRACTS MEV?

Before Ethereum Merge (PoW):

  • Miners extracted MEV

  • Searchers sent bundles to miners via Flashbots

After Ethereum Merge (PoS):

  • Block proposers (validators) extract MEV

  • MEV-Boost introduced a new system:

    • Searchers

    • Builders

    • Relayers

    • Validators


⭐ 5. MEV ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES

🔷 1. Searchers

Independent bots scanning mempool for opportunities.

They:

  • Detect arbitrage

  • Detect liquidations

  • Build transaction bundles

  • Simulate profits

  • Send bundles to builders

🔶 2. Builders

Collect bundles and normal txs → construct the MOST profitable block possible.

Their job:

  • reorder bundled transactions

  • insert searcher’s txs

  • maximize MEV

  • produce block body

🔵 3. Relayers

Middleware ensuring:

  • Builder cannot lie about block

  • Proposer cannot steal searcher’s MEV

  • Deliver block header proofs to validators

🔴 4. Proposers (Validators)

They sign the block that builder gives them.

They get:

  • Tips

  • MEV share

  • Priority fees

This system is called PBS (Proposer–Builder Separation).


⭐ 6. WHERE MEV COMES FROM (REAL SOURCES)

MEV categories:


⭐ A. ARBITRAGE MEV

(DEX to DEX, cross-DEX)

Example:

  • Uniswap price = 2000

  • Sushiswap price = 1990

Searchers quickly buy at Sushi + sell at Uniswap.

MEV: profit from price difference.


⭐ B. SANDWICH ATTACKS

User sends a big swap:

User wants to buy ETH

Attacker does:

Front-run: buys ETH first → price up User swaps at higher price Back-run: sells ETH → profit

This is gas bidding → private mempools reduce this.


⭐ C. LIQUIDATIONS (AAVE, Compound)

User loan becomes liquidatable if collateral falls.

Liquidator bots:

  • monitor oracle feed

  • detect liquidations

  • submit liquidation tx

  • profit from liquidation bonus

This is HUGE MEV.


⭐ D. BACKRUNS (internal pools arbitrage)

Example:

  • User swap changes Uniswap price
    → now there is arbitrage between Uniswap and Sushi
    → bot performs backrun swap


⭐ E. AMM–AMM arbitrage

Between:

  • Uniswap v2

  • Uniswap v3

  • Curve

  • Balancer

  • DEX aggregators

Very common.


⭐ F. NFT arbitrage

Buying undervalued NFT → quick relist.


⭐ G. CEX–DEX arbitrage (Cross exchange)

EVM bots detect price misalignment.


⭐ 7. HOW MEV ACTUALLY WORKS IN THE BLOCK LIFECYCLE

Let’s take you through the REAL sequence:


⭐ Step 1 — User broadcasts transaction

It enters the public mempool.

Everyone sees it.


⭐ Step 2 — Searchers simulate it

Searchers simulate:

if USER swaps 1000 ETH… what arbitrage does that create?

If they detect profit, they create a bundle:

[ tx1 (front-run bot), tx2 (user), tx3 (back-run bot) ]

⭐ Step 3 — Builder selects best bundles

Builder chooses combination of:

  • searcher bundles

  • normal txs

  • optimal ordering

Builder constructs the most profitable block.


⭐ Step 4 — Builder submits to relayer

Relayer:

  • verifies block

  • ensures builder cannot steal searcher’s MEV

  • ensures proposer cannot steal builder’s MEV


⭐ Step 5 — Validator (proposer) signs block

Validator gets priority fees + MEV cut.


⭐ 8. WHY MEV IS INEVITABLE?

Because ANY deterministic blockchain with a public mempool MUST allow:

  • arbitrage

  • liquidations

  • backruns

  • pricing inefficiencies

You cannot prevent MEV.

But you can mitigate harmful MEV.


⭐ 9. TYPES OF MEV

✔ Good MEV (benign)

  • arbitrage

  • liquidations

  • price alignment

  • oracle stability

❌ Bad MEV (toxic)

  • sandwich attacks

  • time bandit attacks

  • frontrunning

  • generalized frontrunning

  • gas sniping

This distinction is important.


⭐ 10. MEV PROTECTIONS

✔ Private mempools (Flashbots Protect)

Hide user tx from attackers.

✔ Intent-based systems (CoW Protocol)

Users submit “what they want”, not raw tx.

✔ DEX MEV protection (UniswapX, CowSwap)

Orderflow auctions reduce sandwiching.


⭐ 11. SUMMARY OF MEV (Deep Understanding)

MEV is the value extracted by:

  • controlling tx ordering

  • inserting txs

  • removing txs

  • simulating mempool

  • building most profitable blocks

Searchers → build profitable bundles
Builders → create most valuable block
Proposers → sign it
Relayers → ensure fairness

MEV is the economic engine that:

  • keeps DeFi prices aligned

  • performs liquidations

  • keeps AMMs efficient

MEV can be both good and harmful.

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